Kim Kataguiri: This also has precedents, Rapporteur. There was an attempt, initially in debates in the 1988 Constituent Assembly and later in a ruling on a writ of injunction, in which the Supreme Court would have recognized, despite the evident link, the non-subordination and non-absorption of the careers of the federal prosecutors by the Advocacia-Geral da União.
Kim Kataguiri: I saw earlier today, also in a report in Folha de S.Paulo, that there is concern that the AGU itself could take upon itself decisions involving the Central Bank.
I also bring a recent history of the use of influence, the use of the political power of the President of the Republic in relation to the Attorney General of the Union, for him to pressure changes in decisions and changes in legal opinions at the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
Kim Kataguiri: There would also be an intervention in the autonomy of the Central Bank, when we know that, fortunately, today we have an autonomous Central Bank, with the freedom to act and the freedom to supervise.
Kim Kataguiri: It is no coincidence that, in a scandal involving the most powerful authorities of the Republic — left, right, center, from the Supreme Federal Tribunal — the Central Bank of Brazil still had the autonomy to initiate the liquidation of a bank that involved tens of billions of reais in corruption scandals and involved such powerful people.